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Abstract. The recently restored Ponca Tribe ofNebraska has faced consid-
erable challenges to the expression of their tribalism throughout the contact
period. As a small. prairie-plains tribe the Ponca have endured the ravages
ofepidemic disease. land cessions. dispossession and removal. assimilation
and finally in 1962. the outright termination of their status as a federally
recognized tribe. The Ponca Tribe ofNebraska has been granted the oppor-
tunity to attempt retribalization with the 1990 Congressional restoration of
their recognized status. The historical circumstances which have contributed
to the assaults on their political and cultural identity will be explored within
the larger framework offederal Indian policy and the metropolis-satellite
model.
We want to terminate because there is nothing here. Our young
men have all gone. They no longer care for farming like in the old
days. They like city life. We have no housing, no work and little to
do. So we want to see our tribal lands and buildings sold and divided
before they tumble down. (Peter LeClaire, interview in Allan 1962)
The Ponca Tribe of Nebraska (Northern Ponca) has suffered the nega-
tive impacts of every major federal Indian policy from treaty-negotiated land
cessions to tribal termination. The Tribe is currently in the process of
retribalization after successfully regaining federally recognized status in
1990. Arguably, the Ponca people have been attempting to "retribalize" for
the past 200 years in response to historical events and deleterious federal
policies which have resulted in the erosion and subsequent subjugation of
Ponca tribal sovereignty and cultural identity.
This paper will focus on the dispossession of the triballandbase as the
primary vehicle by which the federal government has transferred the wealth
and control of natural resources from the Ponca nation (and Native America
as a whole) to the non-Indian political and economic elite, resulting in
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systematic underdevelopment, chronic poverty and cultural dispossession
(Wishart 1990). The Ponca experience will be placed within an explanatory
framework drawn from the "metropolis-satellite" concept ofeconomic devel-
opment and underdevelopment (Baran 1957; Jorgenson 1971, 1978) with
special emphasis on the termination and restoration era.
Metropolis-Satellite
Political economy approaches (see Baran 1957) have become popular in
anthropological analysis of native North America (Jorgenson 1971, 1978;
Fowler 1985; Page 1985; Biolsi 1992; Perry 1993). The metropolis-satellite
concept of economic development and underdevelopment shares many simi-
larities with World Systems Theory (Wallerstein 1979, 1980, 1989) and
Dependency Theory (Kaplan 1978; Frank 1969), namely the rejection of the
unilinear, evolutionary view of economic development known as Moderniza-
tion Theory (Rostow 1960; Portes 1976; McClelland 1967). Applying the
tenets of the metropolis-satellite model to the American Indian experience,
particularly to the appropriation and exploitation of indigenous land and
natural resources, provides a meaningful explanatory framework.
Stated simply, the metropolis-satellite model explains uneven develop-
ment by examining the relationship of the metropolis-the center of political
and economic power and influence-to the satellites-the providers of
resources, labor and consumption (Jorgenson 1978). The growth of the
metropolis is achieved at the expense of the satellites, "the federal govern-
ment aids the process by effecting laws providing massive federal benefits
and maintaining privileges for the metropolis, while providing welfare schemes
(minuscule federal benefits) for the poverty-ridden sectors that are created by
the growth of the metropolis" (Jorgenson 1978:5).
Ponca History and Federal Indian Policy
American ethnology has historically been consumed with attempts to
reconstruct "traditional" (just before European contact) American Indian
culture (Jorgenson 1978; Barsh 1987). For the Ponca, and other Native
Americans, this is problematic and misleading. It is important to place Ponca
history and culture within the historic context of regional and global events.
Culture, by definition, is always changing. Given the trail ofevents the Ponca
have endured, it becomes elusive to discuss "traditional culture" in a defini-
tive manner. The stereotype regarding "traditional culture" is one that plagued
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the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska during their restoration bid. One of the admin-
istrative criteria for tribal restoration required that they "prove" they still
retained their traditional culture (Grobsmith and Ritter 1992). This was
required, despite the generations of wel1-documented assimilation policies
which ultimately caused their termination (e.g., removal, al1otment, boarding
schools, etc.). A brief account of Ponca history and federal Indian policy will
demonstrate how difficult that task would prove to be.
The Ponca were relatively late arrivals, late seventeenth or early eigh-
teenth century, to the Great Plains. Although we lack hard evidence, it is
plausible to assume that the events surrounding the mass migration of the
Ponca, Omaha, Osage, Kansa and Quapaw (Howard 1965; Fletcher and
LaFiesche 1911) in the proto-historic period from the Ohio river val1ey to the
Great Plains were likely precipitated by Euro-American encroachment and
perhaps the desire to escape the ravages of epidemic disease. Once the Ponca
settled in their new homeland on the Niobrara, they began participating in the
regional economy, which eventually included the fur trade.
More directly, we can chart the impacts of federal Indian policy during
the past two centuries (Table 1), detailing treaties and specific policies which
have adversely affected the Tribal landbase. The treaty of 1858 ceded
aboriginal title to the Ponca homeland estimated at 2,334,000 acres (Wishart
1990) in exchange for a reservation of approximately 58,000 acres. A
subsequent treaty was negotiated in 1865 which actually increased the Ponca
reservation by 38,000 acres, bringing the total reservation acreage to roughly
96,000 acres in Knox and Boyd counties, Nebraska. The Ponca received an
average of $0. 195/acre or $455,000 for their aboriginal homeland. The fair
market value was $1/acre or $2,334,000 (Wishart 1990). The proceeds from
the land cessions were not paid directly to the tribe, but were distributed in
annuiti~s, "the government spent the Indians' money in the standard ways:
food, clothes, cattle, horses, farm implements, and salaries for teachers and
farmers" (Wishart 1990: 105).
Three years after settling on their new reservation, the entire Ponca
reservation was ceded to the Teton Dakota in the Ft. Laramie Treaty of 1868
(Howard 1965). The Ponca were never consulted or even informed by the
government of the transfer of their land. Howard (1965:32) describes the
incident as, "inexplicable and an almost criminal blunder." Theresult was that
the Ponca were now trespassers in their aboriginal homeland. The government
admitted the mistake but was unwil1ing to rectify it for fear it would irritate
the Teton (Prucha 1984).
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TABLE 1: NORTHERN PONCA DISPOSSESSION
AND PRIVATIZATION
Historic Acreage Tribal Individual Remarks
Event (+/-) Acres Ponca Acres
Remaining Remaining
Treaty of 1858 -2.334,000 58.000 - est. Ponca
reservation
Treaty of 1865 +38.000 96.000 - incr. reservation
Ft. Laramie -96.000 0 - u.S. Government
Treaty. 1868 ceded res. to
Teton Dakota
Ponca Trail 0 0 - forced removal
of Tears. to Indian
1877 Territory
Return of 0 0 - Occupancy
faction to rights--
Niobrara, old Ponca
1879-1891 reservation
Surplus Land +27,000 160 26,840 under Dawes
Cession and Allotment Act
Allotment. 1891 of 1889
Land -23.228 152 3,620 sale of fee
alienation patent and
(ca. 1900-1936) inherited lands
N. Ponca +695 847 3.620 trust lands
Constitution. acquired under
IRA (1936) IRA
Land -3,620 847 0 sale of remaining
alienation fee patent and
(1937-1966) heirship allotments
Tribal Termi- -833 14 0 Termination
nation. 1962 effective. 1966
(Sources: Howard 1965; Wishart 1990; Froehling 1993)
[figures are rounded]
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The government's final solution was to move the Ponca to Indian
Territory. The scheme to relocate the Poncas was part of a much larger policy
advocating the concentration of all Indians on a few reservations, namely,
"the Indian Territory, the White Earth Reservation in Northern Minnesota,
and a reservation in the southern part of Washington Territory" (Prucha
1990:148). The Ponca were forcibly removed in the Spring of 1877 and
eventually resettled on a reservation of 101,894 acres purchased from the
Cherokees in north central Oklahoma (Howard 1965). Within two years of
their removal to Indian Territory the Ponca had lost fully one-third of their
members to disease, exacerbated by poor nutrition and exposure (Howard
1965).
When Chief Standing Bear's son died, his final request was to be buried
with his ancestors in the old homeland. Standing Bear honored his request and
led a band of 29 Poncas back to Nebraska in the winter of 1879. They were
taken into custody at the Omaha reservation. In the now-famous "Trial of
Standing Bear" (Lake 1981), Judge Dundy ruled that an Indian is a person
under the meaning of the laws of the United States and that "no rightful
authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to Indian Territory."
This landmark decision was among the first Native American civil rights
cases. Standing Bear and his followers were free to stay in Nebraska, but their
former reservation still "belonged" to the Teton.
Standing Bear sued the Tetons to recover their former reservation; and
in 1881, the Tetons relented and agreed to return a portion of the former
reservation. With the passage of the Dawes Severalty Act in 1887 and the
breakup of the Great Sioux Reservation in 1889, the way was clear to dispense
individual allotments to the Ponca heads of household who received 320 acres
each and to single adults who received 180 acres. A total of 167 allotments
were issued, defining 27,202 acres as the new Northern Ponca reservation in
1891 (for an in-depth analysis of Northern Ponca allotment, see Froehling
1993). The Ponca were compensated the equivalent $1.25/acre for the nearly
70,000 acres of their former reservation which was declared "surplus" (after
the Ponca's allotments were selected) and the land was sold to speculators and
settlers (Froehling 1993). The proceeds from the sale were not given directly
to the tribe but were administered on their behalf by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. The majority of the Tribe chose to remain in Indian Territory on their
new reservation and became the "Southern Ponca Tribe" or "Warm Ponca."
242 Great Plains Research Vol. 4 No.2, 1994
Federal Indian Policy
In the early 19th century, "agrarianism" was a prominent social and
political philosophy guiding federal policy. Thomas Jefferson was among the
strongest proponents of this ideal which favored the broad distribution of
wealth as the key to promoting economic security and social equality.
Jefferson felt that a "nation of farmers would be a nation of independent, self-
sufficient individuals, protected thereby from the impositions of the State"
(Cornell 1988:37). Under this guiding principle, land was the necessary
commodity needed to insure the success of the American democratic experi-
ment. More specifically, private property was considered a natural right as
well as the basis for civilized society (Cornell 1988). Because many Native
Americans resisted European-style agriculture and preferred communal (tribal)
land tenure over private property, the policymakers and settlers justified
American Indian dispossession as legitimate because the land was not being
used "properly" (Prucha 1984).
Federal Indian policy in the nineteenth century, provided abundant,
inexpensive land for non-Indian agricultural expansion. Cheap land and
mechanization gradually allowed American farmers to dominate the Euro-
pean markets with low-cost beefand grain (Barsh 1988). Barsh contends that,
"agrarian expansions in the 1830s, 1850s and 1870s were accompanied by
intense land-acquisition activity, whether by outright removal, purchases or
allotment" (Barsh 1988:805). Interestingly, the major land losses suffered by
the Ponca correspond to Barsh's timetable, the Treaty of 1858 ceded 2.3
million acres of aboriginal homeland and the Ft. Laramie Treaty of 1868 and
the subsequent 1877 removal dispossessed the Ponca of their entire 96,000
acre reservation. He further argues that these policies all correspond to
negative trade balances, that Indian land was used in a counter-recessionary
fashion (Barsh 1988) to stimulate the economy. The Indians did not relinquish
their land voluntarily and Battey (1970) estimates the United States spent
about $500,000,000 between 1850 and 1880 on Indian "wars."
At the outset of allotment in 1887, Native Americans retained roughly
140 million acres (Jorgenson 1978: 16) ofthe estimated 2 billion acre aborigi-
nallandbase at the time of contact. Native Americans had lost an additional
91 million of those acres when allotment ended with the passage of the
Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934 (Indian Reorganization Act).
Barsh (1988:810) argues that the "economics of allotment policy re-
volved around grazing land and cattle" to produce inexpensive beef primarily
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for the export market. The privatization of Indian tribal land was used to open
up vast tracts of grazing land for non-Indian ranchers in the West.
After the individual allotments were made, a "trust" period-originally
25 years, but later modified by federal legislation to shorten the trust period-
ensued. Indian agents were vested with broad authority to judge the compe-
tency of allottees to handle their own affairs. If an allottee was judged to be
"competent" the land could be taxed and subsequently sold, if "incompetent"
the agent could manage the disposition of the property. In this manner, the
majority of Indian land not opened up for outright sale was leased to non-
Indians for agricultural purposes.
The Northern Ponca dispossession due to allotment is typical of the
experiences of many tribes. They began with 27,102 acres in 1891, at the end
of allotment only 3,620 acres remained (Froehling 1993: 120). The former
reservation was located in a rural area, the land was suitable primarily for
farming and ranching. The drastic reduction of the triballandbase forced the
migration of many Northern Poncas from the reservation to urban areas in
search of jobs and economic opportunity. The loss of the tribal landbase
increased poverty, separated families and ultimately contributed to the ero-
sion of the Northern Ponca tribal identity. A strong argument could be made
that dispossession due to allotment, was the single most important factor
which led to the targeting and successful termination of the Northern Ponca
Tribe of Nebraska in 1962.
American Indians occupy a status unique from any other minority
population within the U.S. Because the federal government negotiated over
370 treaties with the sovereign Indian nations, promising protection, goods
and services in return for the vast land cessions, responsibility for Indian
affairs has been delegated to the federal government. This relationship is
known as the federal tribal trust relationship. Through time,
the Indians became fully integrated in the metropolis-satellite economy
by signing treaties, relinquishing their resources, and locating on
reservations. They were the first inhabitants of the satellites to
become under-consumers, partly dependent on welfare, who had
little access to their own strategic resources, now controlled by the
federal government, and to the locus of power. (Jorgenson 1978: 11)
The trust responsibility includes obligations to manage tribal assets, includ-
ing land and natural resources.
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Since the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, tribal
governments have been chartered by Congress and supervised by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) (Jorgenson 1978). The BIA is subsumed in the
Department of Interior and is directly accountable to the Secretary of the
Interior. Indian land is private property, held in trust by the Secretary of the
Interior, who has "the broad authority to administer, develop, sell, dispose
of, and otherwise to take all required action respecting both public lands and
Indian (private) lands" (Veeder 1969:461). An obvious conflict of interest
exists in the dual roles of the Secretary of the Interior to protect private
Indian lands simultaneous with the charge of developing public lands for the
national benefit (Barsh 1988). As Winona LaDuke observes:
By official census counts, there are only about 1 1/2 million Indians
in the United States. By conservative estimates a quarter of all the
low sulphur coal in the U.S. lies under our reservation land. About
15% of all the oil and natural gas lies there, as well as two-thirds of
the uranium. 100 percent of all U.S. uranium production since 1955
has been on Indian land. And we have a lot of copper, timber, water
rights and other resources, too. By any reasonable estimation with
this small number of people and vast amount of resources, we should
be the richest group in the United States.
But we are the poorest. Indians have the lowest per capita income of
any population group in the U.S. We have the highest rate of
unemployment and the lowest level of educational attainment. We
have the highest rates of malnutrition, plague disease, death by
exposure and infant mortality. On the other hand, we have the
shortest life span. Now, I think this says it all. Indian wealth is going
somewhere, and that somewhere is definitely not to Indians. I don't
know your definition of colonialism, but this certainly fits into mine.
(LaDuke 1984 in Jaimes 1988:784)
With the destructive nineteenth-century U.S. policies of allotment and re-
moval from their aboriginal homeland, however, the Northern Ponca lacked
any significant natural resources.
Northern Ponca Retribalization
Termination Era
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While the Indian Reorganization Act (1934) provided a much-needed
respite from allotment and outright assimilationist policies, the federal tribal
trust relationship came under sharp attack beginning in 1945. The twentieth
century assault on tribalism consisted of several delicately interwoven legis-
lative and administrative strategies to withdraw the federal government from
their trust responsibility. The three most important were compensation,
relocation and termination. The goal of compensation was to settle all
outstanding grievances against the federal government, via the Indian Claims
Commission established in 1946. Relocation was a policy to move Indians off
the reservation into urban areas, rendering the reservation system obsolete.
Tribal termination was a policy to sever the trust obligation of the federal
government in favor of state supervision and responsibility for tribal affairs.
Iftermination policy had been allowed to reach its logical conclusion, persons
of Native American ancestry would no longer be recognized by the govern-
ment as "Indian"; all treaties with the U.S. would be abrogated, resulting in
the liquidation of the remaining reservation and trust lands and the end of
federal obligations in the areas of health, education and economic assistance
(Ritter-Knoche 1990).
Many argued that terminating the tribes, and their trust lands, was a
humanitarian step that would solve the "Indian problem" by forcing them to
assimilate. Utah Senator Arthur Watkins, architect of the termination policy,
argued that the legislation put the Indians on the road "to complete citizenship
rights and responsibilities" (1957:47). American Indians were supposed to
have had those rights and responsibilities, de jure, since 1924 (Prucha 1984;
Wunder 1994). Regardless of the law, Watkins held to the view that trust land
denied full citizenship (Jorgenson 1978).
Federal Indian policy scholars have posited various explanations for the
termination of the trust responsibility ranging from the need to reallocate
federal budgets to the desire to "mainstream" and "desegregate" Indians
within the context of the growing civil rights movement (Fixico 1986; Deloria
1969; Wilkinson and Biggs 1977; Prucha 1984; Orfield 1970). Arguably, one
strong factor favoring termination of the trust responsibility was a purely
economic one. The liquidation ofthe remaining reservation trust lands would
open the lands managed by the BIA for increased non-Indian sale, leasing and
subsequent resource extraction. Placed within the context of the post-World
War II construction boom, it is likely no coincidence that the first tribes to be
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targeted for termination were the timber-rich reservations (e.g., Menominee
and Klamath). The Klamath case is perhaps the most dramatic,
in the Klamath Basin, the lumber companies clearly became the
actual beneficiaries of Klamath termination in 1961. Although the
federal official expressed concern in preventing exploitation of the
Klamaths, the lumber interests in southwestern Oregon dominated
their actions. Lumber companies, banks and numerous merchants
depended on the Klamath lumber cuttings. (Fixico 1986: 185)
The Klamath case clearly illustrates the placement of termination policy
within the metropolis-satellite model.
The BIA was charged with preparing a list of all the tribes assessing
their "readiness" to handle their own affairs-to terminate (Fixico 1986).
Basically, two categories of tribes were initially targeted: 1) those rich in
natural resources (e.g., Klamath and Menominee) and 2) small, poor tribes
(like the Ponca) who would be unable to resist termination (Olson & Wilson
1984). Fixico (1986:185) suggests, "many people remember termination as
just another land grab for Indian properties."
Between 1954 and 1962, 109 tribes and bands were terminated, affect-
ing 13,263 American Indians and releasing an additional 1,365,801 acres of
trust land (Prucha 1984; Ritter-Knoche 1990; Grobsmith and Ritter 1992).
The Northern Ponca lost their last 834 acres of tribal trust land and 442
Northern Poncas lost their recognition as American Indians and their rights to
the programs and services provided under the trust relationship. The BIA
estimated the value of the remaining trust lands (at the time of termination)
to be $184,080.00, this figure included nearly $100,000 in outstanding
"heirship allotments" (Froehling 1993). In addition to the proceeds from the
liquidation of remaining land, the government also divided any remaining
trust funds, to be paid out in per capita payments. The estimated per capita
distribution was $450 (Froehling 1993).
The Northern Ponca case does not precisely "fit" the metropolis-
satellite argument for the resource expropriation motive of termination
policy, they had been dispossessed of their land and natural resources long
before termination policy evolved. The Northern Ponca, however, are repre-
sentative of the "other" category of tribes- targeted for termination (see
above). For the Northern Ponca, termination marked the final dispossession
of their homeland and their cultural and tribal identity. The Northern Ponca
termination, in 1962, is also illustrative of the bureaucratic machinery of the
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BIA and the federal government in general, which was incapable of re-
sponding to the mounting evidence that termination was a failed policy.
Congress eventually repudiated termination policy in 1988, and has subse-
quently restored nearly all of the terminated tribes seeking federally recog-
nized status (Grobsmith and Ritter 1992).
The deleterious impacts of termination policy are well documented in
terms of the health and overall welfare of the terminated tribes (Peroff 1982;
Fixico 1986). The Ponca were no exception; a socio-economic survey com-
pleted in 1989 (Grobsmith 1989) in preparation for the restoration bid
revealed serious health and economic problems. In 1989, the Northern Ponca
had an adult unemployment rate of 57%; 31 % of individuals surveyed fell
below the poverty line; 40% of households reported they had been unable to
seek medical care within the last year-due largely to a lack of financial
resources and health insurance (24% of households had no insurance); and
86% believed that termination had caused a loss of heritage in their families
(Grobsmith 1989; Ritter-Knoche 1990; Grobsmith and Ritter 1992).
Restoration of the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska
The Northern Ponca were the last to be terminated, and are the most
recently restored (October 31, 1990). Restoration efforts began in earnest in
1987, with the founding of a non-profit organization, the Northern Ponca
Restoration Committee Inc. (NPRCI). The NPRCI had limited eligibility for
federal funding, because the Northern Ponca were not a federally recognized
tribe. Consequently, most funding was raised from private sources. Fred
LeRoy, project coordinator for NPRCI, estimated $150,000 to $185,000 was
raised during the restoration period.
Because the Northern Ponca were congressionally terminated, they
chose to seek congressional restoration. The Northern Ponca Restoration bill
was first introduced in the Senate, a successful hearing was held in March of
1990. Considerable difficulty accompanied the legislation in the House of
Representatives. Nebraska representative Bereuter declined to sponsor the
legislation. It was introduced unsponsored. Congressman Bereuter appeared
at the House hearing to oppose the Restoration bill in its current form. His
primary objection was to the possibility the Northern Ponca may some day
choose to re-establish a residential reservation in northeastern Nebraska. Rep.
Bereuter, at that time, represented the Nebraska district which included the
Santee, Winnebago and Omaha reservations. Congressman Bereuter made his
position clear, stating:
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I think it is anachronistic for the United States to be creating addi-
tional Indian reservations in the last half of the 20th century ... I
don't think it is at all responsible for us to condemn Ponca children
to be born and raised in a reservation environment. It is one thing
for Ponca adults to choose to segregate themselves off from the rest
of society on a reservation, and I would not ordinarily want to deny
them that opportunity. However, their born and unborn children and
grandchidren and great grandchildren who have no choice about the
matter shouln't be condemned to live in the kind of deprivation that
will undoubetdly continue to exist on our nation's Indian reserva-
tions in the future. (Bereuter 1990)
Beyond his fundamental objection to re-establishing a reservation for the
Northern Ponca, Bereuter was also concerned about the loss pf property tax
revenue that would result from taking Indian land into trust status (removing
the land from the local tax rolls). Bereuter's political priority was to curry
favor with his non-Indian constituency, in the process he was willing to forego
the historic opportunity to correct a grievous error in federal Indian policy.
The 1989 NPRCI socio-economic survey revealed that fully 90% of
Poncas surveyed favored the re-establishment of the Northern Ponca reser-
vation. The NPRCI leadership discussed the feasibility of re-establishing a
reservation with Nebraska Senators Exon and Kerrey, who were not generally
in favor of the proposition. The NPRCI leadership decided to pursue alter-
native proposals that would better serve the widely dispersed tribal member-
ship, namely, an economic development plan to provide employment and
tribal self-sufficiency. While the Northern Ponca leadership was resigned to
the fact that the political climate was not conducive to establishing a reser-
vation at that time, they were reluctant to be prohibited from ever seeking
one. The harsh political reality was that they had to capitulate to Congressman
Bereuter's stipulation that they would never seek a residential reservation.
The restoration bill was re-written and quickly passed the House and returned
to the Senate for approval. President Bush signed the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska
back into existence on October 31, 1990 (P.L. 101-484).
Although Bereuter was keen to prevent the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska
from re-acquiring their aboriginal homeland as a residential reservation,
under P.L. 101-484 the tribe is allowed to purchase up to 1500 acres of land
in Knox and Boyd counties, to be taken into trust by the Secretary of the
Interior. Further, they will be allowed to build housing on their trust land
(including Housing and Urban Development [HUD] housing programs avail-
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able to other reservations), but they will be precluded from exercising any
additional jurisdictional authority as tribes with reservation trust lands do
within their external boundaries. No funds were appropriated by Congress to
underwrite the purchase of land, the Tribe will have to raise the necessary
funding.
Restoration of the Northern Ponca's federally recognized status entitled
the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska to gain access to Bureau of Indian Affairs' "new
tribes" money, set aside to help newly recognized tribal governments estab-
lish infrastructure. Enrolled tribal members, living in the six service delivery
areas (in Nebraska and South Dakota), became eligible for numerous health,
education and economic programs. Restoration has not, however, been the
panacea once envisioned by the NPRCI leadership.
Upon restoration, administrative responsibility for tribal affairs was
vested in the interim tribal council, composed of the board of directors of the
NPRCI. This arrangement was intended to be temporary, until a tribal council
was elected and a constitution ratified. Because of the timing of the restora-
tion, the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska missed the BIA funding cycle and did not
begin receiving regular tribal funding until October of 1991. Initially, office
space was leased in Omaha, Nebraska, and equipment and staff procured as
money was made available. During this time the interim tribal council
(NPRCI board of directors), was compiling the tribal roll, drafting the
constitution and developing and implementing service delivery to tribal
members.
The NPRCI has faced considerable difficulty in developing and main-
taining consensus since its inception. One result has been considerable
turnover on the board of directors. This pattern persisted after restoration and
intensified as federal funding became available in the fall of 1991. This
tension eventually resulted in the development of two rival factions, both
claiming to be the legitimate interim tribal council. The two rival interim
councils vied for recognition for several months, resulting in considerable
confusion for tribal members as well as government oversight agencies. The
BIA declined to intervene and awaited the outcome of the court hearing to
decide which group was the legitimate representative. The Niobrara-based
faction successfully challenged the Omaha-based faction by electing a new
board of directors for the NPRCI, as per the articles of incorporation for the
NPRCI (a Nebraska non-profit organization). The election of the new board
(interim tribal council) was recognized as the legitimate interim tribal council
by District Judge Richard Garden of Norfolk, after a two-day hearing in the
fall of 1992 (Lincoln Journal Star, November 8, 1992).
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Tribal headquarters are now located in Niobrara, Nebraska (in the
aboriginal homeland of the Ponca). The interim council has acquired and
renovated new office space, hired staff and secured the Indian Health Service
(IHS) contract for health care delivery to enrolled tribal members. The interim
council also has the responsibility of administering the tribal enrollment
process; the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska currently has 1,283 enrolled members.
The Ponca Tribe of Nebraska requires no minimum blood quantum for
enrollment purposes. To be enrolled in the tribe, one must either be listed on
an earlier tribal roll (1934, 1936 or 1965) or demonstrate that one is a lineal
descendant of an enrolled member listed on an earlier tribal roll. Dropping
blood quantum requirements was a departure from BIA policy, but was
strongly argued in the Northern Ponca case. The BIA has used blood quantum
as a means of limiting the number of Indian individuals eligible for federal
services (Jaimes 1988). Because each enrolled member of a federally recog-
nized tribe (currently 547 tribes) costs an estimated $3,000 (Office of
Management and Budget) annually for services, the BIA was anxious that the
trend of dropping blood quantum be limited to small tribes, like the Ponca.
The Ponca Tribe of Nebraska argued that their treaties were worded to include
the "Poncas and their descendants" and did not specify a particular blood
quantum. Therefore, constitutionally, no basis for a blood quantum require-
ment exists.
Numerous delays accompanied the drafting and review process for the
new tribal constitution. The BIA finished the final technical review of the
document and final copies were mailed to the tribal membership for a
ratification vote in June of 1994. Upon successful ratification of the tribal
constitution, the first tribal council election was scheduled to commence
within 120 days (as required by P.L. 101-484). The first official tribal council
election of the Ponca Tribe of Nebraksa was October 21, 1994. The first
elected tribal council will have greater autonomy in regards to administering
contracts' and grants, resulting in less oversight from the BIA and a greater
degree of tribal self-determination for programs and service delivery.
In foregoing a residential reservation, the NPRCI negotiated the provi-
sion in P.L. 101-484 to submit an economic development plan to Congress for
approval and subsequent funding. It was hoped that a good economic devel-
opment plan would provide employment for tribal members and eventually,
economic self-sufficiency for the Tribe. The interim-Tribal council con-
tracted with ASW Associates of Lincoln, Nebraska, to prepare the economic
development plan, which was submitted to the BIA and Secretary of the
Interior for review in the fall of 1993. The plan outlines an entrepreneurially
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based framework, which would provide technical and financial assistance to
individual tribal members who want to start businesses. The plan will
eventually be submitted to Congress for final approval and funding.
The Tribe has repurchased the old Northern Ponca Community Hall
(southwest of Niobrara, Nebraska) and will begin renovation of the site in
1994. The Community Hall will be nominated for the National Historic
Register and lies very near the old Ponca cemetery, the only land retained by
the tribe after termination (14 acres). A traditional Ponca powwow was held
on the grounds of the Community Hall in August of 1994. The powwow
featured an historic "reunification ceremony" with the Soutern Ponca. The
tribe is negotiating the purchase of various other properties in Knox and Boyd
counties to be used for economic development and residential purposes.
The Tribe has hired a Cultural Affairs Director to coordinate cultural
programs, including the repatriation of human remains and sacred artifacts
required by the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA) of 1990 (25 U.S.C. 3001-3013). The Tribe hopes to establish a
museum and archival library for tribal members who wish to return to
Niobrara to learn more about their heritage.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska has arguably been undergo-
ing repeated attempts at retribalization since the initiation of contact with
Euro-Americans. As a direct result of assimilationist federal Indian policies,
such as removal, allotment, and termination, the Poncas have been forced to
perpetually reinvent themselves as a people and an Indian nation. Arguably,
the ultimate goal of these policies was to separate Indian peoples from their
land and control over their own resources. For the Ponca, the drastic reduction
and eventual loss of their tribal landbase has resulted in poverty as well as
political and cultural breakdown. This vulnerability led to termination-the
final assault on their tribal sovereignty. While it is true that the Poneas
approved their termination, their acquiescence must be placed within the
historical context of their painful past and their hopelessness for their future
as a people. It is clear that the tribal leaders, as well as the membership,
believed that it was over for the Ponca. Federal policies had so devastated the
Ponca people that there was no rational reason for expecting that would or
could ever be reversed. Termination simply formalized a process which had
begun generations ago.
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The Ponca leaders of today have a different vision. For them, termina-
tion was a devastating mistake which never should have been allowed to
happen. Termination dispossessed the Ponca of their land, their culture, and
their identity as a people. Today, nearly 30 years later, the challenge is to
rebuild what has been lost. The Ponca have the opportunity to attempt
retribalization one last time. While they share many of the same problems and
concerns of other Native Americans, they are also like no other tribe in the
United States. The Ponca Tribe of Nebraska is an urban tribe with no landbase
and no resources and they have suffered an extremely high degree of cultural
loss. The challenges to meld a political and cultural future for the tribe are
considerable. The Ponca leadership faces the prospect, once again, of rein-
venting and retribalizing for the children, the grandchildren and the great
grandchildren to come. Perhaps that is what it means to be Ponca.
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